Ancient Minds Not Conscious by Riahi, Idris
 
Zeitschrift für junge Religionswissenschaft 
9 | 2014
Jahresausgabe 2014







Deutsche Vereinigung für Religionswissenschaft
 
Electronic reference
Idris Riahi, « Ancient Minds Not Conscious », Zeitschrift für junge Religionswissenschaft [Online], 9 |
 2014, Online since 31 December 2014, connection on 10 December 2020. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/zjr/222  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/zjr.222 
Dieses Werk ist lizenziert unter einer Creative Commons Namensnennung - Nicht-kommerziell - Keine
Bearbeitung 3.0 Deutschland Lizenz.
Zeitschrift für junge Religionswissenschaft|Vol. 9 (2014)   
Ancient Minds Not Conscious Idris RIAHI 
Dieses Werk wird unter den Bedingungen einer Creative-Commons-Lizenz 
(Namensnennung–Keine kommerzielle Nutzung–Keine Bearbeitung 3.0 






ZjR – Zeitschrift für junge Religionswissenschaft / ISSN 1862-5886
URL: http://zjr-online.net, URN: urn:nbn:de:0267-18625886-9
Riahi, Idris. 2014. »Ancient Minds Not Conscious« Zeitschrift für junge Religions­
wissenschaft 9:22-38. URN: urn:nbn:de:0267-201404-riahi-6.
22
A
Julian Jaynes zufolge hat sich Bewusstsein spät in der Menschheitsgeschichte entwi­
ckelt. Zuvor hatte der Mensch keinen bewussten Zugriff  auf  mentale Inhalte.  
Die Organisation des Geistes basierte auf  der Zusammenarbeit zweier Bereiche  
der bikameralen Psyche (d.h. zwei mentale ›Räume‹): Es erschienen Halluzina­
tionen von den Stimmen von Göttern, die immer dann zum Vorschein traten,  
wenn ein bestimmtes Stresslevel  überschritten wurde (beispielsweise  beim Fällen  
von Entscheidungen), deren Befehle von der anderen Seite sogleich ausgeführt wur­
den. Diese Form mentaler Organisation lässt sich in antiken Texten wie der Ilias  
belegen. Dieser Artikel stellt Jaynes Theorie vor, liefert eine religionswissenschaftli­
che Analyse seiner Interpretation der Ilias und diskutiert abschließend die Impli­
kationen von Jaynes Arbeit in Bezug auf  die Religionswissenschaft.
According to Julian Jaynes, consciousness has developed only recently in the history  
of  mankind. Before man gained conscious access to mental content, the organiza­
tional structure of  the mind had rested upon the working together of  two parts,  
the »bicameral psyche« (i.e. two mental ›rooms‹). The hallucinated voice of  a god  
appeared whenever a certain stress-level was reached (e.g. when decision-making  
was due) which again made the human side of  the »bicameral mind« execute the  
god’s command. This mentality is reflected in texts of  antiquity such as the Iliad.  
In this paper we present Jaynes' theory, analyze his interpretation of  the Iliad,  
and discuss implications for the  scientific study of  religion. 
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Introduction
The theory we are dealing with was first published 1976 by the title: The Origin of  
Consciousness in the Breakdown of  the Bicameral Mind (hence: The Origin of  Consciousness). 
Princeton psychologist Julian Jaynes aims to explain what consciousness is, where 
it came from, and why it emerged (Jaynes 2000, 1). The presentation of  the theory 
makes  strong  claims  about  religion  as  well,  which  are  to  be  addressed  in  the 
following. By characterizing religion as a constitutive factor in the emergence of 
consciousness  (»gods  [as]  organizations  of  the  central  nervous  system« [Jaynes 
2000, 74]), Jaynes' study (primarily focussed on Homer's Iliad) touches upon two 
old discussions in the scientific study of  religion: a) What is the Early Greek concept  
of  ›soul‹?  b) Is man in the Iliad determined by the gods, or does he have free will? It is our 
aim to assess  whether  his  interpretation  of  the  Iliad  provides  support  for  his 
theory.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that  while  in  science  of  religion discourse  Julian 
Jaynes seems to be neglected entirely, other authors have made use of  his ideas on 
religion. We will first briefly report on the impact Jaynes has had on other scholars 
outside our field, and then – in reference to Daniel Dennett's 2006 publication on 
religion – investigate an application of  Jaynes' understanding of  religion.
Theory and reception
According to Sleutels (2006, 177) »academia has been proportionately dismissive« 
towards Jaynes. The most outspoken critic is philosopher Ned Block, who rejected 
Jaynes'  claim as  »patently  absurd«  (ibid.,  178),  while  on  the  other  side  of  the 
spectrum is Daniel Dennett, who appreciates Jaynes not only as a »fellow social  
constructivist«  (cf.  ibid.)  but  relied  on  Jaynes'  notion  of  divination  to  make 
plausible why early men needed the belief  in gods to cope with the challenges of 
everyday life (see below discussion of  Dennett 2007). »How could one take such a 
book seriously?«, Dennett (1998, 121) wonders: »Because it asked some very good 
questions that had never been properly asked before and boldly proposed answers 
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further,  suggesting  a  kind  of  »Software  Archaeology«  with  which  he  seeks  to 
answer the question of  why people today are conscious beings. The »revolution« 
which Jaynes claims must have happened to bring about consciousness was »not an 
organic« one, but a »software revolution«, so that by means of  reverse-engineering 
we  can  reveal  the  nature  of  consciousness.  (Dennett  1998,130)  Authors  from 
different fields mention Jaynes'  Origin of  Consciousness for some of  its many other 
ideas. Steven Pinker (1998, 133), for instance, briefly highlights the idea of  con­
sciousness as a recent development (in this context also see Prinz 2006, 272, and 
Reber 2003, 621). For a reference to the idea that the communication with gods in 
early man is neurologically manifested in the brain, see Brams 2006, 4. For his 
work on auditory hallucinations see Bever 2008, 85, who used it in context of  the 
study of  witchcraft in Early Modern Europe. Richard Dawkins in his 2006 book 
»The God Delusion« dedicates a few paragraphs to Jaynes' theory (2000, 350ff.), 
where he, like Dennett, plays around with the idea that early minds were driven by 
the voices of  gods, soon enough, however, discarding the notion. Unlike many of 
his contemporaries, and later authors who still receive Jaynes (even if  only to men­
tion his ideas and subsequently destroy them), Dennett understands one of  his 
own most popular works, Consciousness Explained (1991), to be an attempt aiming at 
those »very good questions« that before Jaynes had never been asked (Dennett 
1998, 121). To Dennett this way of  conceptualizing consciousness is on the right  
track – and  direction for that matter, as it goes top-down. He begins at a crucial  
point, i.e. at the phenomenon (how does consciousness appear to us?) itself, and 
works the way down from there to make clear what are the indispensable elements 
to achieve consciousness. Thus Jaynes delivers »one of  the clearest and most per­
spicuous  defenses  of  the  top-down  approach  that  I  have  ever  come  across«,  
Dennett maintains (1998, 123). Jaynes project was to aim at »bridging what he calls 
the ›awesome chasm‹ between mere inert matter and the inwardness, as he puts it,  
of  a conscious being« (Dennett 1998, 121).
Consciousness as a terminological/cultural problem
»There is in general no consciousness in the Iliad«, Jaynes (2000, 69) claims, instead 
antiquity was crowded by people with bicameral minds.  By this term he envisioned a 
mind made up of  two separate mental »rooms« (in analogy to the two brain hemi­
spheres),  in which different mental tasks were performed. Jaynes refers to this as 
the »double brain«, (chapter 5, 100-125) where there is a dominant left cerebral 
hemisphere  and  a  non-dominant  right  cerebral  hemisphere.  Both  hemispheres 
were able to communicate via language so that one could inform the other about 
what is going on in the world. This did not happen all the time, as to some extent 
the tasks in daily life could be solved by instinct. However, when a more challeng­
ing  task  turned  up,  and  bicameral  people  were  due  to  make  more  complex 
decisions, their stress level rose significantly over a threshold at which it began to 
24
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trigger auditory hallucinations (emerging from the right hemisphere).  Bicameral 
people  perceived  this  as  the  voice  of  a  god  delivering  an  answer  which  was 
consequently carried out by the other half, the listener part. All of  this happened 
unconsciously: none of  the hemispheres produced any kind of  content that was 
phenomenally  accessible  (see  below  phenomenal-  and  access-consciousness).  In  other 
words, neither the »god-« nor the »man-part« was conscious of  the action (Jaynes 
2000, 84).
When asked what consciousness is, one might intuitively refer to the brain and its 
biological  evolution.  Perhaps we are then intuitive physicalists  and believe con­
sciousness to be a property of  the physical world rather than culture. Conscious­
ness appears to us as a most familiar thing, and we can barely imagine there could  
ever be human beings without it (cf. Jaynes 2000, 84), but so Jaynes claims. As a  
social constructivist he relies on culture rather than on biology (cf. Sleutels 2006, 
177f.). Culture, understood as »exogenetic information«, has a similar impact on 
the development of  man as evolution but without genetic mutation, and it gives 
way to a kind of  a »virtual evolution« (McVeigh 2007 [Part 2 of  2], 00:07:12). In  
this  sense  consciousness  is  not  a  universal  quality  of  human  mental  life,  an 
inevitable faculty of  the homo sapiens' brain. When societies are able to achieve 
consciousness individually, depending on their history and further cultural devel­
opments (writing, social organization, religion), the brain plays a much smaller role 
than initially assumed. 
Let us consider the etymology of  the term consciousness: The German word 
›Bewusstsein‹ is only about 300 years old and was introduced as a nominalization 
of  sich etwas bewusst-seyn, into Bewusst-seyn, by German philosopher Christian Wolff, 
(1679-1754) entering  the  dictionary  in  1719  (Metzinger  2009b,  00:27:25).  The 
English equivalent occurred for the first time in the words of  the Archbishop of 
Ussher  in  1620,  »who  said  ›(I  was)  so  conscious  vnto  myself  of  my  great 
weaknesse‹  «  (Wilkes  1988,  18).  The concept  did not  only  denote some  inward 
awareness, but also has been used to express »shared knowledge« (ibid.), cf. con and 
scire  (to know together). »The term ›consciousness‹«, however, »did not appear until 
1678,  ›self-consciousness‹  not  until  1690.«  (ibid.)  The  antonym  »unconscious« 
appeared for the first time in 1712 signifying »unaware, lacking conscious thought«, 
in 1860 the notion »temporarily insensible, knocked out« was added, and »subcon­
scious« as in »not wholly conscious« was to be used for the first time in 1886  
(McVeigh 2007 [Part 1 of  2], 00:07:17). In her comparative study, Kathleen Wilkes 
(1988, 16), presents the English terms consciousness (and mind) as »notoriously  
difficult to translate into other languages«. With »(relative) confidence« she (1995, 
98) claims that at least the major European languages clearly show these issues. 
Complications in translation is not an unusual problem of  course, but becomes 
quite revealing when those terms in question refer to concepts that are essential in  
scientific investigations: for instance when a theory in physics lacks »notions of 
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›conscious(ness)‹ anything like these?« (ibid.) What does it tell us than apparently a 
fair number of  people in different cultures at different times in human history 
have not found it necessary to develop a term: consciousness? 
Bicamerality instead of  consciousness
So,  what is it like to be a bicameral man? And how does such a mind work? The 
world, Jaynes speculates, would merely »happen to him and his action would be an 
inextricable part of  that happening with no consciousness whatever« (Jaynes 2000, 
85). Thrown into a new situation, a bicameral person cannot sit down and reason 
consciously  on  how to  act.  Her  only  chance  of  facing  situations  with  proper 
reactions was to listen to the hallucinated voice, »which with the stored-up admon­
itory  wisdom of  [her]  life  would  tell  [her]  nonconsciously  what  to do«  (ibid.).  
There is a »lack of  mental language« that leaves the people in need for something  
with which to initiate action, and this role is played by gods (cf. 78). Gods were  
part of  men, they could not step out of  the natural law, which can be seen in the  
fact that the Greek gods never create anything ex nihilo, unlike the God of  the 
Old Testament (ibid.). Any everyday decision which »could not be dealt with on 
the basis of  habit« was sufficient to cause hallucinations (Jaynes 2000, 93). With 
this depiction in mind it  may dawn to those familiar with the Iliad how Jaynes  
came up with such a theory. There we find Gods and humans in a specific interac­
tion. Touching on an old debate in the science of  religion, we shall now begin to 
evaluate this depiction. 
The Early Greek concept of  the soul
Jaynes' major support of  his assumptions is based upon etymological observations: 
There are »no words for consciousness or mental acts« in the Iliad (Jaynes 2000, 
69). Those words only at a later age came to mean »mental things« (ibid.).  Psychē, 
according to Jaynes,  is  derived from the verb »psychein  = to breathe,  [and]  has 
become internalized into life substances in  its  main usage in the  Iliad« (Jaynes 
2000, 270f.). There is yet no psychological attribution to the term psyche. »No one 
[in the Iliad] in any way ever sees, decides, thinks, knows, fears, or remembers any­
thing in his  psyche« (271). Bremmer (1983, 3f.) comes to a similar conclusion: in 
Homer's epics »the word psyche has no psychological connotations whatsoever.« 
So Homer and his contemporaries »did not yet have ›cognisance of  any concept 
denoting the psychic whole, of  any notion that might correspond to our word 
›soul‹« (ibid.). Finsler 1914 and Marg 1938 come to similar conclusions. Marg refers 
to the terms νόος and θυμός, and none »denote something essential, immutable or  
something that is rooted in man, i.e. his character …« (Sarischoulis 2008, 41, trans­
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addresses mental nor spiritual (geistige,  seelische) forces, not in life and not in death 
(Finsler 1914, 146). 
Pivotal studies were conducted by Swedish Sanskritist, Ernst Arbman, who in an 
analysis of  Vedic soul belief  in India could show »that the concept of  the soul  
(ātman, puruṣa) was preceded by a duality where the eschatological and psychologi­
cal attributes of  the soul had not yet merged« (Bremmer 1983, 9). Arbman identi ­
fied two types in his analysis which he called »body souls endowing the body with 
life and consciousness and the free soul, an unencumbered soul representing the 
individual  personality«  (ibid.).  Both souls  are active at different times when the 
individual is either sleeping (free soul is active) or waking (body soul is active);  
further, while it is unclear where the free soul resides, the body soul can be divided 
into the following categories: »one is the life soul, frequently identified with the 
breath, the life principle; the other is the ego soul. The body soul, or several parts,  
represents the inner self  of  the individual« (ibid.). At this stage in Vedic soul belief 
the notion of  a unitary soul has not yet arrived, however, at some point these con­
cepts will merge.  Arbman speaks of  a development of  the »concept of  psychē [...] 
into  the  modern  unitary  soul«  (Bremmer  1983,  11).  Latter  »would  reach  its 
completion  only  at  the  end  of  the  fifth  century«  (14).  Based  upon  Arbman's 
methodology, Bremmer comes to the conclusion: The »early Greek concept of  the 
soul« in the »Archaic Age« was a »dualistic« one (Bremmer 1983, 66). Following the 
terminology from Arbman's analysis of  Vedic soul belief, the two elements can be 
called the free soul and the body soul. Concerning the free soul, the Greek notion 
of  psychē  »corresponds most with Arbman's concept«, the only exception being 
that »the activity of  the soul in trance and dream […] is only evident in post-
Homeric  times« (ibid.).  Bremmer hints  at  a  point  of  criticism which has  been 
raised by many authors, i.e. the limitation of  Arbman's dualistic principle: »Instead 
the Greek soul  belief  might  best  be  characterized as multiple«  (ibid.).  Still  the 
development is the same, a »unitary soul can only be found in the period after the 
Archaic Age« (ibid.). 
However, it was argued that despite the lack of  a concept of  a unitary soul, 
»early Greeks could easily say I wish or I thought and, consequently, must have had a 
general sense of  psychic coherence and at least, an imperfect notion of  the unity 
of  personality« (Bremmer 1983, 66f.). Bremmer continues to state that the Home­
ric individual did not yet have a notion of  will in terms of  an ethical factor, »nor  
did he distinguish between what was inside and outside himself  as we do (67). The 
early Greeks and other Indo-European peoples, »did not primarily consider them­
selves to be independent individuals but rather members of  a group« (ibid.). But  
we are advised not to carry this argument too far (cf. Bremmer, 67). It is save to  
conclude that  the  »Greeks  perceived  the attributes  of  their  personalities  to be 
structured differently than we perceive ours today« (68), but that does not yet lead 
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Early Greek gods and the problem of  free will
Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά 
This century old piece of  literature would thus be considered not the product of 
conscious man, but an epic hallucinated by an »entranced iron-age bard«, chanting 
to his fellow people »standing at the ruins of  Agamemnon’s world« (Jaynes 2000, 
73). The characters of  the Iliad do not »sit down and think out what to do«, they  
are not conscious people and »certainly« have »no introspections« (72). To prove 
that, several text references are given in The Origin of  Consciousness. In all of  them 
we are presented the same motif, gods are the ones playing the vital roles, not peo­
ple (Jaynes 2000, 72). But is the text that reliable? Indeed Jaynes claims: »The Iliad 
is not imaginative creative literature and hence not a matter for literary discussion. 
It is history, webbed into the Mycenaean Aegean, to be examined by psychohistori­
cal scientists« (76). The Iliad is not meant to be treated as a »sociological docu­
ment« (78), rather it is meant to be treated as a »psychological document« (ibid.). It  
is an account of  »constant action«, as Jaynes claims »[i]t really is about Achilles’ acts 
and their consequences, not about his mind« (79).
So, what do we know about the nature of  the Homeric gods? This question is 
addressed and thoroughly dealt with by Burkert 1991, who investigates a »special 
picture of  divine beings« at the »crossroads of  religion and poetry« (81). From him 
we  learn  that  Nilsson  (1924,  369)  understands  anthropomorphization  (Vermen­
schlichung) as one of  the legacies of  the Homeric time. Gods are presented in an 
»unheroic,  all-too-human  vein«,  (cf.  Burkert  1991,  81)  which  Greek  poet  and 
philosopher, Xenophanes, harshly criticized in the works of  Homer and Hesiod 
(ibid.). They »put upon the gods everything that is shame and reproach among 
men, stealing and committing adultery and deceiving each other« (ibid.). It was also 
due to Xenophanes that »a system of  postulates of  what a god should be like« 
began to develop. This system claimed that a god should be »without need, not 
only immortal but ungenerated, all-knowing, omnipotent, and hence exempt from 
any sexual, thievish, or cunning activities« (ibid.). However, anthropomorphization 
had another function as it obstructed the enchanting perception of  gods, which 
was usually widely spread at that time, as for instance is the case in the Egyptian 
religion (Nilsson 1924, 369). Such a perception had the effect that people felt fear 
and awe in front of  the gods (cf.  θεουδής). Nilsson concludes, »[t]he Homeric 
anthropomorphization broke these chains. Hence man was free to discover the 
world on his own; this was the origin of  Greek science« (Nilsson 1924, 369, trans­
lation: Author). And fittingly Burkert (1991, 81) adds: »[This] is a traditional form 
of  narrative, to be understood from its function within heroic tale, developed in 
Greece under the influence of  oriental models.« As for evidence, Burkert (1991, 
82) takes on a scene in the fifteenth book of  the Iliad in which Hera reacts with 
amusement: »Hera’s smiling is a hint on how the audience should react.« Burkert 
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oppressive  superego«  (ibid.),  as  religion is  generally  viewed »with  awe in  most 
civilizations« (ibid.) – emphasizing the same effect as what Nilsson indicates. This 
is,  however,  not  meant  as  a  »serious  revolt«  but  rather  a  form of  narrative,  a 
»divine burlesque« (ibid.), giving a genuine narrative trick to the poet, helping to 
catch and hold the audience's attention by that which is »uncommon, amazing or 
thrilling« (ibid.).
Yet, indeed there are a lot of  textual references showing that the conception of 
free will  was different then. No decision in Homer happens within the human 
being.  (cf.  Sarischoulis  2008,  33f.)  Voigt  1934  explicitly  searched  for  concepts 
denoting »to consider« and/or »being indecisive«, suggesting the terms μερμήριξεν 
and ὁρμάινειν. In an analysis of  the references of  the words Voigt comes to the 
conclusion that μερμήριξεν is not so much used as to express the aspect of  uncer­
tainty of  the thinker, but rather indecisiveness as an objective conflict (Sarischoulis 
2008, 35). In a similar way ὁρμάινειν, which refers more to the emotional, denotes 
something different from our contemporary understanding of  decision (»Entschei­
dung«). Concerning the term to decide (»Sich-Entscheiden«), Voigt does not find a 
corresponding term, so strictly speaking, there isn't even a term for »to choose«. In 
close semantic proximity we find ἁιρεῖν, αἱρεῖσθαι, however, both signify the taking 
of  something (by itself) »(Für-Sich-)Nehmen« (ibid.). 
In  conclusion,  Voigt  denies  any  consciousness  of  personal  freedom  of 
Homeric man: »Human beings in Homer are not portrayed as responsible for their 
own deeds, neither in good or in bad, or in their own consciousness or in that of  
their fellow human beings« (Sarischoulis 2008, 39, translation: Author).
Divination and decision making 
Daniel  Dennett  in  his  2006 (here  quoted as  Dennett  2007)  case  for  a  natural 
science  of  religion  borrows  from  Jaynes  and  states  that  divination  facilitates 
decision making, which is an asset in an ever more complex society. It can be seen 
as  one  of  few merits  of  Dennett  2007  to  engage  a  multitude  of  theories  on 
religion (also from outside of  peer reviewed science of  religion discourse), and 
thoroughly  discuss  their  explanatory  value.  Yet,  not  everybody  may  agree  that 
Dennett 2007 does any good at all to the scientific study of  religion (cf. Geertz 
2008).  An interesting example of  his  theoretical  elaborations to be picked out,  
however, is the application of  Jaynes' theory of  divination. 
He begins by adopting Jaynes' stance who proposed that when human groups 
were becoming larger in size and more complicated in structure, decision-making 
was  becoming more complicated as well  (Dennett  2007,  133).  »Few things  are 
more anxiety-provoking than not being able to decide what to do next or what to 
think about next«  (Dennett  2009, 00:48:40).  The people of  that  time,  Dennett 
claims, solved this problem by divination (Dennett 2007, 132). Thus people can get 
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ping coins, but in case of  more momentous challenges flipping coins or the like 
would not be convincing, Dennett argues,  so people resort to something more 
impressive, more ceremonial. (Dennett 2007, 133) Divination, or in Jaynes’ words 
»exopsychic methods of  thought or decision-making«, he argues, 
»could have risen in popularity simply because those who happened to do it liked the 
results enough to do it again, and again, and then others began to copy them, and it  
became the thing to do even though nobody really knew why« (ibid.).
According to Jaynes, Dennett emphasizes the idea of  »randomness or chance« 
is of  rather recent origin. Before, everything that happened was supposed to mean 
something, and the people needed to know what it meant. It was not so important  
to reason over the source of  the information than it was to obtain that informa­
tion, to believe that there is somebody somewhere who knows what is right and 
she or he is telling you (cf. 133f.). The invention of  divination again happened in  
the dark as people did not know what they were doing as they used the free-float­
ing rationale to create rituals »that permitted them [...] to ask their departed ancest­
ors what to do next« (Dennett 2009, 00:49:22).
Dennett  places  this  discussion into the chapter  about the  roots  of  religion, 
»Religion in the Early Days« (2007, 116ff.) giving his readers an account of  how it 
all came about. 
Conclusive discussion
In this paper we have shown that Jaynes' theory of  the emergence of  conscious­
ness  is  rested  upon  his  interpretation  of  Ancient  Greek  religion,  the  people's 
understanding of  soul, gods, minds and free will as revealed in the Iliad. For the 
most part of  his work he reviewed philological and historical studies in order to 
make his point of  Ancient Greek non-conscious societies. We have proceeded in 
similar fashion but also included contemporary studies of  the philosophical debate 
of  consciousness to engage his claims from another perspective. In the conclusive 
discussion we shall deepen one or the other discussion on the point to assess the  
value of  Jaynes' theory for the study of  religion.
The first problem addresses the scarcity of  textual evidence. No other text of 
antiquity is as extensively discussed as the Iliad. References are made to the Odyssey  
(272ff.), the Gilgamesh Epic (251ff.),  Works and Days (278ff.), and others but analy­
ses, if  any, remain on a superficial level, merely repeating what has already been 
said about the Iliad. Like in many other occasions, Jaynes was conscious of  this 
weak spot and knew how to defend it. In anticipation he states that with the Iliad 
we have the »first writing in human history in a language of  which we have enough 
certainty of  translation«  (Jaynes 2000, 68). What exactly is meant by certainty of 
translation is  neither  explained nor  hinted at.  We are  unable  to judge whether 
philologists are in much less command of  the language of  the textual evidences 
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elaborate argumentation, we assume, Jaynes was neither. Further, if  indeed ancient 
people  had such a fundamentally  different kind of  mentality,  shouldn't  it  even 
reflect more vividly and richly in more writings of  that time? Shouldn't we be able 
to point at a much deeper but also greater variety of  linguistic and cultural items 
of  that kind?
The second problem raises the question: What is it that Jaynes wants to explain 
about consciousness? What is his explanandum? To establish the background on 
which to discuss this question we refer to Block 1997 and 2007. Here he narrows 
down the problem to two concepts of  consciousness, i.e. phenomenal conscious­
ness (P-consciousness) and access-consciousness (A-consciousness). P-conscious­
ness, Block argues, cannot be defined in »any remotely noncircular way«, and the 
best you can do for it is »point to the phenomenon« (1997, 380). The  pointing at, 
however, has to be conducted properly, in Block's sense it can be achieved »via 
rough synonyms« (ibid.), 
»P-consciousness is experience. P-consciousness properties are experiential proper­
ties. P-conscious states are experiential states – that is, a state is P-conscious just in 
case  it  initiates  experiential  properties.  The totality  of  the  experiential  properties  
instantiated in a state are ›what it is like‹ to have it« (Block 2007, 276).
Examples of  that are the states that are present »when we see, hear, smell, taste,  
and  have  pains«  (ibid.).  The  controversial  part  begins  when  we  differ  those 
P-conscious properties from »any cognitive,  intentional,  or functional property« 
(Block 1997, 381). P-consciousness Block claims, is that which »has seemed such a 
scientific mystery« (ibid.). Chalmers (1996) even refers to this as the ›hard problem 
of  consciousness‹ (also see Thomas Nagel 1979 below), distinguished from the 
easy  problems  which  refer  to  the  function  of  consciousness.  Still,  there  are 
attempts to solve this problem from a neurophysiological perspective (e.g. Crick 
and Koch 1990). The second concept of  consciousness, A-consciousness,  is to be 
kept separate from P-consciousness. By access-consciousness Block understands 
mental states which have a content that is 
»(1) poised to be used freely as a premise in reasoning, according to the capabilities 
of  the reasoner, (2) poised to be used freely for control of  action. In the case of  lan­
guage-using organisms such as ourselves, a major symptom of  access-consciousness 
would be reportability« (Block 2007, 144).
In other words, access-conscious states are states whose contents can be used 
by an organism to control reasoning, language and behavior (cf. ibid., Block 2007, 
164).
Let us dwell a bit more on the fascinating notion of  P-consciousness. Thomas 
Nagel (1979, 166) famously argued that on a basic level when an organism has 
conscious experience »there is something that it is like to be that organism«. This 
what it  is  like  quality, however, is a most elusive thing, and certainly not a clear 
notion (cf. Wilkes 1984, 224). Seemingly accessible only by first person perspective 
it  appears to be somewhat detached from the physical structures of  the mind.  
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cally and conscious experience. To highlight the gravity of  the problem, we could 
concoct a being which is »physically identical to [us] (or to any other conscious 
being), but lacking conscious experiences altogether« (Chalmers 1996, 94). Despite 
whether or not  philosophical zombies exist, the notion may at least be conceptually 
coherent – enough, it is argued, to keep up the attack on physicalism (cf. ibid., 
94ff.). Philosophers call those entities philosophical zombies, or just  zombies, and 
by definition »[t]here is nothing it is like to be a zombie« (ibid., 95).
So  what  do we  have  in  Jaynes?  Access-  or  phenomenal-consciousness?  He 
claims that Greeks did not feel anything inside (84), but it still remains debatable  
whether that is to say the Ancient Greeks did not have P-consciousness. Some 
people argue this is not of  interest for Jaynes, as he seems to be more concerned 
with self-consciousness than with phenomenal  consciousness (or  P-conscious­
ness). (Chalmers 1996, 30) Others again argue that there is something it is like to be  
unconscious, so there are no Greek zombies (cf. Sleutels 2006) in Chalmers' sense after 
all. Williams (2010, 10) claims that »a bicameral mind is phenomenally-conscious 
but not access-conscious«, and this seems to explain best what we have here,  as  
there is a mind to perceive mentally but that »mental content is not accessible for 
conscious access,  voluntary  control,  or rational  articulation«  (ibid.).  The crucial 
question as Williams puts it, »is whether it is plausible that our human ancestors 
could  have  lacked  consciousness  proper«  while  having  access  to  phenomenal 
contents  and  being  able  to  engage  in  »an  elaborate  behavioral  repertoire  of 
complex cultural phenomena, including speech, religion, tools, problem solving, 
writing, etc.« (ibid.).
The third problem refers to Jaynes'  too strong interpretation of  the absence of 
»proper« terms.
As  we  have  shown  by  reference  of  the  works  of  Metzinger  and  Wilkes, 
consciousness (and mind) are not necessary categories of  a language. One may feel 
puzzled by the fact that many cultures have not found it important to devise a 
word for the concept. As was shown in reference to Bremmer (1983, 66), however, 
we must accept that even if  there should not be a term in Homeric Greek which  
signifies consciousness or the psychic whole, it does not necessarily follow that it  
was not communicable, not to mention that the thing itself  – whatever it may be – 
did not exist. According to his most renowned critic, Ned Block (1981), Jaynes has 
done  exactly  that:  he  confused  the  phenomenon  with  the  name  of  the  phe­
nomenon or the concept of  it. This is to say that even if  his analysis was correct  
then all he could relate to is the arrival of  the concept a few hundreds of  years 
ago, and not the phenomenon. Considering that Jaynes' conclusion rests on the 
lack of  a proper term we must concur with Block, and again point at the fact that  
the term in German or English is not even 400 hundred years old.
The fourth problem points at the fact that Jaynes favors a biased interpretation 
of  the  anthropomorphism displayed in the presentation of  the Ancient  Greek 
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of  the Homeric gods, and the problem of  free will. Jaynes exploits this debate to 
make a case for his bicameral theory. However, we are talking about literature here, 
not about empirical data. The Iliad may contain hints which reflect a different kind 
of  mentality in antiquity, but how can we be sure this peculiarity is not due to this 
kind of  literature? This piece has gone through stages of  development, beginning 
as oral tradition until it arrived in that textual form Jaynes and we discuss today (cf.  
Patzek  2003,  41-59).  As  we  have  seen  above,  Burkert  establishes  a  coherent 
approach on how to understand these Greek gods. He does so without postulating 
an outlandishly different mentality, but by referring to the style of  narrative. 
We may then understand the Iliad as a document which shows the same narrat­
ive tricks that also work today. Consider Boyer 1994 and his notion of  a  cognitive  
optimum (e.g. 121), which suggests »certain combinations of  intuitive and counter­
intuitive claims [to] constitute a cognitive optimum, in which a concept is both 
learnable and nonnatural.« In this way, the gods of  the Iliad may have simply con­
tributed to the »catching and holding of  attention« as explained by Burkert before,  
and as possibly supported by such a theory of  a cognitive optimum of  narratives. 
To add yet another, more recent take on Jaynes, we shall bring Brian Boyd’s 
2009 publication  The Origin of  Stories – Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction.  Similar to 
what was suggested above, he states that we should not confuse our folk termino­
logy with »definite features of  mind«, which are in need of  a revision that »only  
scientific psychology can make possible« (Boyd 2009, 256). Further, Boyd specu­
lates that perhaps the opposite of  what Jaynes claims could be the case. Jaynes saw 
the presence of  the Olympian gods as a confirmation of  the »absence of  a mod­
ern mind or at least a modern notion of  mind« (Boyd 2009, 281). One might actu­
ally turn the claim on its head: »Religion plays such a prominent role for Homer 
and his characters precisely because they have a fully human sense of  mind« (ibid.). 
The human need to read the intentions and desires of  other people results from 
the fact that it may make »the most dramatic difference to our chances and choices 
day by day«. Thus, »our understanding of  other minds has evolved into our richest 
natural mental capacity« (ibid.). It is this mental faculty which we find represented 
in so many colorful ways in Homer's Iliad; and it is religion, we shall agree, which  
shows best what modern mind Ancient Greek men must have had. 
Let us close our discussion by making some remarks regarding Dennett's appli­
cation of  Jaynes. A thorough assessment of  the theory requires another scope, and 
certainly a different preparation to begin with, thus we will solely graze the limits 
and chances of  Jaynes' theory for the scientific study of  religion. For both Jaynes 
and Dennett the practice of  divination is to be understood as a formula to cope 
with the continuing challenge in facing the possibilities that are offered to society 
each and every day. This seems to resonate thematically with a plethora of  theories 
proposing ever new examples of  religion as a strategy to cope with contingency 
(Religion als Kontingenzbewältigung). The examples given by Jaynes and Dennett, 
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Mesopotamia but it could well have been taken from anywhere else in the history 
of  religion. As Dennett points out, the basic function of  divination is this: »to pass 
the buck«; and if  you need to pass it, »pass it to something that can't duck the 
responsibility in turn, and that can be held responsible if  things don't go well«  
(Dennett 2007, 133). Passing the buck or »flipping a coin« works with a multitude 
of  objects, so that essentially belomancy, rhabdomancy, haruspicy and so forth are 
the same (132f.). Certainly, such a »free floating rationale« (133) will have a social 
function which can be investigated,  but we do need to care about how it  was 
embedded culturally! The claim of  a universal cognitive function may well begin by 
such a Jaynesian »just-so story« (Dennett 1998, 125), but the debate need not end 
there. So why the unwillingness to provide more examples? Both do not care much 
for connecting the specific divinatory practice to its cultural environment. And it 
does not even seem as if  they needed to: while Jaynes uses religion to make plausi­
ble his ideas of  the origin consciousness, Dennett, on the other hand, follows the 
old and trodden path to display religion as a philosophy of  need: in accordance 
with radical criticism of  religion discourse, where religiosity is only practiced in 
order to compensate for the shortcomings in life (cf. Lübbe 2004, 144).
This is not to say that Dennett and Jaynes are not right in their observations,  
and divination could indeed be a universal concept of  human religious culture, and 
could perhaps be best explained in terms of  coping with contingency. Yet, as long 
as the debate shuns the reconciliation of  cognitive  and cultural accounts, we are 
fobbed off  by  mere  just-so stories,  and our  testing of  the  theory  has  already 
shown some fundamental deficits. To establish an understanding of  religion that 
both satisfies cultural specificity, and at the same time agrees with, and is informed 
by, the cognitive sciences is a daring and intriguing attempt. One might argue that 
in his thorough preparation of  neurological and psychological facts about human 
life, and his way of  presenting those facts as the foundation of  the relation of  man 
to god(s), Jaynes delivered an early attempt of  a cognitive science of  religion. But 
just as with many contemporary studies of  that kind he (and Dennett no less) 
makes the mistake of  merely presenting one account of  the functions of  religious 
practice. We shall conclude by stating that with support of  a strong focus on cul­
tural studies and a much wider scope of  samples, cognitive accounts of  this kind 
may well deliver a powerful working hypothesis in the scientific study of  religion.
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